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I.  THE ARGUMENT 
In her paper, Anna Spain discusses challenges and opportunities 
for international adjudication. She understands international 
adjudication as a means (i) to resolve (as opposed to “settle,” which 
would merely require agreement among parties) (ii) disputes (as 
opposed to “conflicts,” which imply the use of force) (iii) pertaining to 
international law (as opposed to “international relations,” which is used 
more broadly). Spain sets two goals for her paper:  to identify 
challenges for international adjudication and to introduce new 
perspectives.1  
For most of the paper, Spain criticizes the lack of effectiveness of 
international courts. She does so by identifying the three main court 
 
* Professor of Public International Law and European Law, University of Fribourg (Switzerland). 
Many thanks to Cesare Romano and Yuval Shany for inviting me to comment on an early draft of 
Anna Spain’s paper Examining the International Judicial Function:  International Courts as 
Dispute Resolvers and to participate in the panel, International Judges as Dispute-Settlers and 
Law-Enforcers, at the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) Conference in 
Amsterdam on March 18, 2011. Thanks to Anna Spain for a fascinating and innovative paper and 
to all participants for an interesting discussion. In considering its current style, please note that 
this article was drafted as a set of comments, not as a self-standing article. 
 1. Anna Spain, Examining the International Judicial Function:  International Courts as 
Dispute Resolvers, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 5, 7, 8 (2011) [hereinafter Spain, 
Examining]. 
  
functions:  peace-making, dispute-settlement, and law-enforcement.2 In 
short, and by reference to those three functions, Spain identifies the 
barriers to the effective international adjudication as being:  first, the 
peace versus justice dilemma confronting international judges; second, 
the limited subject, scope, and factual blindness of adjudication itself; 
and finally, the lack of voluntary or coerced compliance with 
international judgements.3 
In her introduction and conclusion, Spain also stresses that the 
specific challenges facing international adjudication actually provide 
opportunities for a discourse about the role of international 
adjudication.4 She claims that on the basis of a clear understanding of 
the shortcomings of international adjudication, we should be able to 
identify new ways to develop international adjudication.5 Additionally, 
she claims that these new methods are essential to preserving the 
overarching goal of global peace and security, a primary issue for 
Spain.6 The most prominent of her proposals for reforming international 
adjudication is the sequential grouping—or even the mixing or 
integrating of international adjudication with other international dispute-
resolution (IDR) mechanisms.7 This would counteract the different 
challenges she identified to the three functions of international 
adjudication.8 
II.  THREE COMMENTS 
I have three sets of comments on Spain’s paper:  the first is 
conceptual; the second is methodological; and the third is a general and 
more substantive comment on the function of international adjudication. 
A.  A Conceptual Comment 
To begin, I have two minor conceptual quibbles. Clarifying the 
concepts we use to refer to international adjudication is a first step 
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towards the overall theoretical understanding of it. There is much to 
gain from keeping a close eye on our terminology and concepts.9 
Spain uses the concept of international dispute-resolution 
throughout her paper and distinguishes it from international dispute-
settlement. Her differentiation between resolution and settlement 
pertains to whether or not the dispute’s underlying issue has been 
resolved. For Spain, whereas dispute-settlement can take place by mere 
agreement, dispute-resolution requires in-depth resolution of the issue.  
I see three difficulties with Spain’s distinction. First, because of 
the necessarily subjective nature of a dispute, there is an inherent 
consensual component to any dispute. This is also the case for legal 
disputes, which require a disagreement among parties not only to arise, 
but also to subsist and be set aside as a result. It suffices to think of the 
Nuclear Tests case10 to assess the importance of contestation for an 
international legal dispute to arise and subsist, and hence of agreement 
for its resolution.  
Second, I have difficulty with Spain’s distinction between dispute-
resolution and dispute-settlement and her idea that adjudication can 
objectively address and solve a legal issue. Aside from the disagreement 
component of any legal dispute and its previously addressed resolution, 
I do not think a court can ever objectively resolve a legal issue. This 
would not only amount to judicial law-making, which, as I discuss here, 
is not in itself objectionable, but it would also amount to law-making 
tout court and turn judges into full-blown law-makers. This is even 
more controversial in international law because it would mean replacing 
states and international institutions in the general and abstract law-
making process with judges. Regardless of how close to law-making 
judicial interpretation actually comes in practice, the distinction 
between law-making by political institutions and judicial law-making 
remains central. This important distinction not only underlies the 
concept of judging and adjudication in general, but presumably also 
underlies the concept of international law.11 
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The final problem I see in Spain’s notion of dispute-resolution is 
her inclusion of non-judicial dispute-settlement mechanisms into IDR. 
Spain asserts that resolution amounts to more than agreement.12 
However, it is difficult to understand how mediation can lead to the 
resolution of the underlying issue in an international dispute. Reducing 
IDR mechanisms to adjudication may be a way to escape this problem. 
But, this strategy is not appropriate in light of Spain’s mixed or 
integrated IDR proposal.13  
With respect to Spain’s integrative proposal itself, I do not think 
integrating other IDR mechanisms into international adjudication is 
feasible if one is to retain the specificities of adjudicative functions. 
First of all, a court cannot ever include all stakeholders, as proposed by 
Spain, to fully resolve the issues at hand; a judicial dispute is by 
definition limited to the parties to a dispute. The same applies to 
international judicial disputes. Even if one takes into account third party 
interventions and indispensable third parties,14 a court cannot include all 
subjects or state interests potentially affected by its decisions. Nor could 
a court, domestic or international, ever address non-legal issues 
(whether raised by the parties or not) even though addressing them may 
help resolve the dispute more globally. 
Of course, I share Spain’s aspiration for a holistic treatment of 
disputes, the inclusion of non-legal considerations (when possible), 
complete factual clarity, and the inclusion of all stakeholders.15 I also 
support her extremely insightful critique of the current “pigeon-hole” 
approach to IDR mechanisms.16 And she is right to warn against the 
dangers of their rigid association with distinct institutions.17 However, 
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we already have competition between different IDR mechanisms and 
even between international courts. Parties also experiment sometimes 
with potential synchronic or even diachronic aggregation of IDR 
mechanisms. This kind of competition and/or aggregation can do a lot 
of the work Spain suggests and can help provide parties (who want it) 
with the kind of holistic approach the author highlights. Spain actually 
exposes these existing synergies very well in her paper, particularly by 
referencing recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral case 
law.18  
True, more work could be done to enhance publicity about the 
different options, referrals, and coherence of international mechanisms 
and decisions.19 However, I cannot agree with Spain when she proposes 
integration of IDR mechanisms and the inclusion of adjudication.20 I do 
not think that adjudication can cope with the integration of otherwise 
political features into the judicial process. As I will argue in Part III, 
IDR mechanisms have different functions and various features 
corresponding to those functions. One should therefore not expect any 
one IDR mechanism to fulfill all of those functions at the same time. 
This is why assessing those mechanisms’ effectiveness by reference to 
how they promote all those functions together would only be 
disappointing. Moreover, integration would paradoxically enhance the 
risk of pigeon-holing of different functions by forcing the delineation of 
functions within each institution or the further distinction of institutions. 
Hence, integration may deepen some of the problems Spain rightly 
identified earlier in her paper. 
A second conceptual difficulty I have encountered in Spain’s 
argument pertains to the notion of law-enforcement. In the early version 
of her paper, Spain referred to law-enforcement as compliance with 
judicial decisions, and discussed the limitations of both coercive and 
voluntary compliance with international judicial decisions.  
The problem lies, I think, in the use of the term “enforcement” in 
international law scholarship generally and its built-in reference to force 
and coercion. In the context of the functions of international courts, we 
should be careful to understand law-enforcement to mean legal 
implementation exclusively or even legal development, and leave aside 
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two issues:  the question of the enforcement of law, on the one hand; 
and the question of the enforcement of judgements, on the other. Even 
in domestic circumstances, courts do not, strictly speaking, use coercive 
means to implement the law, but leave that task to the executive. 
Instead, they apply the law to a set of concrete facts and interpret it 
further in light of those facts. Moreover, courts are not necessarily 
involved in the enforcement of their judgements either—that, too, is a 
task devolved to the executive. 
Once it is understood as law-application and development, 
however, international law-enforcement clearly is a necessary feature of 
judicial dispute-resolution. After all, what distinguishes adjudication 
from other IDR mechanisms is precisely that the resolution it offers is 
based on law and, as a result, contributes to implementing the law. In 
this sense, while IDR does not necessarily imply law-enforcement, 
judicial dispute-settlement or adjudication does. As a result, separating 
the dispute-resolution function of international courts from that of law-
enforcement may be counterproductive. I will come back to this point 
and discuss these two functions of international adjudication and their 
relationship in my last set of comments. 
I will make one short passing comment on Spain’s discussion of 
the enforcement of judgements, however. Some authors conflate the 
objective effect of international court judgements (i.e., the duty to 
comply with judgements) with effective subjective compliance with 
those judgements. There are many reasons to comply or not to comply 
with a judgement, and those reasons can sometimes be completely 
independent from the judicial decision and function, as well as from the 
duty to comply itself. Moreover, contrary to what Spain argued in an 
earlier draft, the lack of compliance with a court’s judgement does not 
make that court and its judgements illegitimate. Understood objectively, 
legitimacy or legitimate authority is not a consequence of obedience but 
a condition to obedience. Objective legitimacy should not be conflated 
with acceptance or subjective legitimacy, in other words. Although 
there may well be a connection between objective and subjective 
legitimacy in the long run,21 they are two distinct forms of legitimacy,22 
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and it is useful to distinguish them in discussions of international 
adjudication. 
B.  A Methodological Comment 
My second set of comments is methodological. Again, although 
this comment pertains to Spain’s paper in particular, it may also apply 
more generally to other arguments about the effectiveness of 
international adjudication.  
There has been a growing tendency among international law 
scholars to approach international adjudication as a fact or reality that 
may be assessed practically, as opposed to a normative practice that 
may be criticized normatively.23 This approach is also shared by Spain 
in her paper:  She wants to assess international courts by reference to 
their effectiveness in the three functions she identifies.24 She does not 
justify those functions, but instead takes them for granted. I will return 
to this point in my third set of comments.  
There are two general difficulties I see with the effectiveness 
approach to international courts or adjudication.  
The first problem poses a question:  Why should the lack of 
effectiveness of international adjudication affect its functions and the 
way in which it is able to fulfil those functions? In each individual case, 
international courts indeed adjudicate to the best of their abilities.25 As 
such, and from an individual and prospective angle, an assessment of 
international courts’ functions need not take their effectiveness into 
account.26 Certainly, if international adjudication was only rarely 
compulsory, or its judgments rarely complied with, this would affect its 
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attractiveness to potential parties.27 Even independent of state consent to 
jurisdiction, a totally ineffective institution in the international legal 
system may in the long run be questioned, just as it would in a domestic 
legal system.28 Those objections rely, however, on the possibility of 
assessing effectiveness in the first place, a possibility that may be 
illusive due to its profound indeterminacy. 
The second problem with the effectiveness approach is precisely 
its indeterminacy. The multiplicity of internal and external factors 
influencing the effectiveness of an institution can make it difficult to 
assess them all. Moreover, it is difficult to measure their combined and 
respective importance. To take just one example, the reasons for the 
lack of compliance with international judicial decisions can be 
extremely diverse. While the overall lack of compliance may deter some 
states from opting for international adjudication, the same or other 
reasons could encourage others to opt for international adjudication. 
Finally, in assessing the effectiveness of international adjudication, it is 
difficult to know exactly what dimension is being assessed within the 
complex normative practice of adjudication. For example, are the court 
and its members at stake? Its process? Its reasoning? Its interpretations? 
Its decisions? Its authority? One may imagine an international court 
being very effective in producing interpretations of international law, 
even though in practice the parties in the dispute only rarely comply 
with the court’s decisions. 
There is a third difficulty in Spain’s analysis of the effectiveness of 
adjudication as a tool for dispute-resolution, one that arises from her 
understanding of the functions of international adjudication. 
Adjudication has specific functions and features that distinguish it from 
other mechanisms of dispute-resolution. Its effectiveness cannot 
therefore be assessed in the same ways as those of other dispute-
resolution mechanisms. Nor can its lack of effectiveness in the dispute-
resolution function be mentioned together with its lack of effectiveness 
in law-enforcement without considering the proper relationship between 
those two functions—particularly where the lack of effectiveness in one 
may be the source of greater effectiveness in the other. The time has 
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come therefore to look more closely at the actual functions of 
international adjudication. 
C.  A Substantive Comment 
The following comments are substantive, and pertain to the actual 
functions of international adjudication.29 Spain identifies three main 
functions of international adjudication:  peace-making, dispute-
resolution and law-enforcement.30 Since her paper is directed to 
assessing their effectiveness, she does not justify these functions, 
instead stating that she will simply take them for granted as a starting 
point for her argument.31 Nor does the paper explain how these three 
functions relate to one another. Parts III and IV of this article will 
complement Spain’s argument with a brief discussion of the functions 
of international adjudication and their relationship with each other. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION IN NEED OF LEGAL THEORY 
Before turning to the functions of international courts, this article 
will define more closely what is meant by international adjudication. 
Based on the use of the concept in practice, a common concept of 
adjudication can be assumed. This common concept is not only shared 
among various international courts, but also shared between 
international and domestic courts.32 In a nutshell, one may take 
adjudication to be a dispute-resolution mechanism that issues binding 
 
 29. See generally CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
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2003) (addressing the descriptive and prescriptive nature of adjudication). Another interesting 
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decisions based on law rendered by permanent and independent judges 
and according to due process.33 Adjudication may in turn be deemed 
international when the court and its procedure are created and regulated 
by international law.34 
Although international adjudication can presumably share these 
features and a common nature with domestic adjudication, it is 
important to draw some distinctions between international and domestic 
courts, on the one hand, and between different international courts, on 
the other. Those distinctions will indeed play out when fine-tuning the 
functions of international adjudication later in this article. 
 First of all, international courts share the same functions as 
domestic courts to the extent that they apply law to a specific case, 
albeit a different kind of law.35 As a result, international courts are 
confronted with the same problems. 
There are two famous difficulties to emphasize in this respect:  
First, the question of judicial law-making and the opposition between 
law and politics; and second, the related question of judicial discretion 
and the opposition between democracy and morality.36 Obviously, these 
two difficulties are even greater in international adjudication where 
there is less determinative law, less democracy in the absence of a 
centralized international legislator, and less common morality in the 
absence of a political community with common values. 
Clearly, if international judges function as judges, their judicial 
reasoning and decision-making imply law-making, albeit of a judicial 
kind.37 Strictly speaking, they are not lawmakers38 and their decisions 
 
 33. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts:  Uneven Judicialization in 
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also Tzanakopoulos, supra note 34, at 136–37. 
 36. Regan, supra note 25, at 226. 
 37. See von Bogdandy & Venzke, Beyond Dispute, supra note 11, at 987–89; Marc Jacob, 
Precedents:  Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1005, 1005–32 
(2011). 
  
cannot be counted among the formal sources of international law (Art. 
38 ICJ Statute).39 However, they cannot avoid interpreting the law when 
applying it because their interpretation has consequences for their own 
future application of the law (so-called precedent) and the general 
understanding of the law outside their specific court (so-called erga 
omnes effect of international judicial decisions).40 Some see an 
exclusion of the interpretive authority (res interpretata) of international 
decisions and especially ICJ decisions in the ICJ Statute (Art. 59)41 and 
the UN Charter (Art. 94(1)).42 Others understand those provisions as a 
mere reminder of the relative scope of those decisions’ decisional 
authority (res judicata) and not as an exclusion of their interpretive 
authority.43 As a matter of fact, the jurisgenerative function of judges is 
more important in international courts than in domestic ones, given the 
limited number of sources of international law. Moreover, by virtue of 
the application of the non-liquet in international law, international 
judges already use general principles to fill legal gaps. This is 
 
 38. See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 
I.C.J. 6, 34 (July 18). 
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discipline. (Emphasis added). 
 39. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 para.1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993.  Of course, this does not exclude the contribution of judicial decisions to other 
international law-making processes and sources, such as customary international law in particular 
See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions?, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1033, 
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International Law—Whose Principles?, in LES PRINCIPES EN DROIT EUROPÉEN—PRINCIPLES IN 
EUROPEAN LAW 21, 30 (S. Besson & P. Pichonnaz eds., 2012) [hereinafter Besson, General 
Principles]. 
 40. For a more detailed discussion of those notions and distinctions, see Besson, Erga 
Omnes, supra note 14, at 359, 388–89. 
 41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
 42. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1. 
 43. See Jouannet, supra note 11, at 359, 388–89 on the distinction between judicial law-
making and law-making tout court, on the one hand, and between interpretive and decisional 
authority, on the other. See also Besson, Erga Omnes, supra note 14, at 129–37 (discussing 
Article 46, paragraph 1 of the ECHR and the difference between the relative decisional authority 
of the ECtHR’s judgments and their general interpretive authority). 
  
particularly true in relatively new fields of international law, such as 
international criminal law or international environmental law.  
Besides sharing the same, albeit magnified, difficulties as domestic 
adjudication, international adjudication has unique difficulties of its 
own.44 Primarily, these have to do with the sources of applicable 
international law.  
First of all, international judges are called to do much more than 
interpret and apply the law, which is already quite challenging 
depending on how one understands judicial interpretation. They also 
have to identify international law and general international law from 
non-written sources, such as customary international law or general 
principles. That identification and validation of international law goes 
beyond the scope of ordinary judicial law-making in the domestic 
context, and comes very close to law-making tout court.45 The ICJ 
Statute (Art. 38(1)(d)) confirms this ambivalence by referring to judicial 
decisions as a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law,” 
but nonetheless includes them in a list of formal sources of international 
law.  
Second, the fragmentation or plurality of sources, regimes, and 
norms in international law makes judicial interpretation even more 
pivotal than in the domestic context. The effects of this legal 
fragmentation are heightened by the fragmentation of international 
adjudication itself. Although legal and judicial fragmentations do not 
necessarily reinforce each other, they may do so, thus giving judicial 
interpretation of the law greater import.46 
Legal interpretation is not the only area of concern for 
international courts. Legal identification itself also creates difficulties. 
International courts do not only face the usual critiques pertaining to 
judicial law-making, but also newer and arguably graver critiques 
pertaining to international legality tout court. This is why some authors 
have rightly argued that we need a theory of international adjudication 
 
 44. Regan, supra note 25, at 227–29. 
 45. I am using identification (in a strong sense) as a contribution to legal validation in the 
absence of an international legislator (see also Regan, supra note 25, at 228) and not as mere 
descriptive recognition of valid norms to be applied (see, e.g., Kuhli & Günther, supra note 40, at 
1266). International judicial decisions are sometimes referred to as material sources of 
international law; although they may function as material sources, however, this does not quite 
capture their other specific (judicial) law-making function. 
 46. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International 
Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 805 
(1999). 
  
that draws on the numerous existing theories of domestic adjudication, 
but that also expressly addresses international adjudication’s own 
theoretical difficulties.47 Whereas important research has been 
conducted on the empirical and judicial dimensions of international 
adjudication in recent years, the essential questions it generates for the 
theory of adjudication are only beginning to be raised.48  
The second distinction announced before pertains to the distinction 
between international courts themselves. International courts have 
proliferated since the 1990s and there are many different types of 
international courts today.49 Some are generalist, while others are 
specialized; some are universal, while others are regional; some have 
 
 47. See, e.g.,  Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of 
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compulsory jurisdiction, while others do not; some have exclusive 
jurisdiction, while others do not; some can monitor the enforcement of 
their judgements, while others cannot; some resolve interstate disputes, 
while others are also open to individuals or international organizations; 
some assess facts and law anew, while others only monitor the 
application of international law by domestic institutions; some belong to 
an international organization’s institutional structure, while others do 
not; and so on. 
 Those variables necessarily impact the functions of international 
adjudication, which will be discussed below. Although they do not 
change international courts’ basic functions, those variables contribute 
to fine-tuning and adapting courts’ functions to the institutional 
circumstances of each court.50 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION IN NEED OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
With these caveats in place, it is time to turn to a theoretical 
discussion of the actual functions of international adjudication and the 
difficulties it faces. The definition I gave earlier refers to both functions 
of dispute-resolution and application of law:  (i) Judges resolve legal 
disputes by applying the law; and (ii) when they apply the law, they 
contribute to its interpretation and development, while also allegedly to 
its overall normative coherence, and presumably its legitimacy.51 
Interestingly, those two functions of dispute-settlement and law-
enforcement cohabitate without difficulties in the domestic context. 
They are usually considered an aggregate and their relationship is not 
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questioned. Those two functions, however, are clearly separated within 
international legal practice, as they have been in international legal 
scholarship for a long time.52 Interestingly, the view within the academy 
is beginning to change.53 
Let us see why they are usually separated, before discussing ways 
of reconciling them. First of all, there are clear, practical reasons to 
distinguish between the two functions of dispute-resolution and law-
enforcement. These reasons are the non-compulsory nature of 
international adjudication, on the one hand, and its non-exclusive 
nature, on the other. In these circumstances, the judge is not necessarily 
called to interpret the law, and if she is, it is not necessarily in an 
exclusive and authoritative fashion. As long as international 
adjudication remains one of many IDR mechanisms and a non-
compulsory one, it cannot fulfil its usual function of law-enforcement 
the way it would in the domestic legal order. Contrary to what the case 
would be domestically, currently different courts may interpret 
international law differently and there can be as many judicial 
interpretations as there are courts. Furthermore, judicial interpretation of 
international law is not even necessary to resolve legal issues that may 
be resolved through other IDR mechanisms. This explains why 
international courts themselves may sometimes resort to other IDR 
mechanisms to settle a dispute without fully enforcing the law.54 Finally, 
even when they apply and interpret international law to resolve a 
dispute, international courts do not have a sufficiently important and 
regular flow of cases that would suffice to interpret it authoritatively. 
International courts can therefore be said to have jurisdictio but without 
the imperium, its usual correlative in domestic courts.55 
Second, the relationship between the two judicial functions 
remains complex in practice, which makes reconciliation difficult. The 
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idea that individual judges called upon to settle a dispute between states 
can also contribute to interpreting international law and hence substitute 
themselves for its authors and primary law-makers (i.e., states) is in 
conflict with a certain consensualist approach to international law. This, 
in turn, explains why the relationship between dispute-settlement and 
law-enforcement is particularly problematic in areas where non-
consent-based, objective, and general international law has developed 
but adjudication is still consent-based and non-exclusive. One may 
think, for instance, of cases in which the ICJ qua non-compulsory and 
non-exclusive jurisdiction applies international human rights law. As 
long as the legitimate authority of international law was deemed 
equivalent to that of a contract between private parties, consent-based 
adjudication fit very well:  the scope of judges’ legitimate authority 
matched that of the applicable law. That is no longer the case, however. 
This hiatus, or tension, has become a problem with the development of 
objective international law more generally because, unlike adjudication 
mechanisms, that law is not based on state consent.56 
 International law has long developed as a “law without courts,” to 
coin the famous dictum,57 but this is no longer the case. International 
law itself has caught up with the reality that it is not only applied by a 
multitude of international courts but often needs the kind of 
interpretation and implementation that only international courts can 
provide. 
The current contrast between objective international law and 
subjective international adjudication is not only a problem for the 
international legal order, however. It is also a concern for judges 
themselves who are uneasy about their functions. And this explains why 
the dispute-resolution function is regularly highlighted as a primary 
function of international courts and the ICJ in particular. To some, it 
serves mainly a refuge function.58 This may explain how the idea of 
judicial law-making has been banned officially from judicial 
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discourse,59 whereas it has long been accepted in domestic 
jurisprudential circles. International judges’ denial of their judicial law-
making powers is not so much based on their being blind or resistant to 
progress in semantics and in legal theory, as it is on their perception of 
their law-enforcement and law-development functions sitting uneasily 
with those of their dispute-resolution function. What one may refer to as 
the schizophrenia of the contemporary international judge stems from 
her being called to function as a judge in circumstances that prevent her 
from using half of her functions. 
One wonders about the reasons for the resistance of the 
international legal order to proper adjudication and for the untenable 
disconnect between the two pieces in the puzzle of adjudication. 
Arguably, one important reason is the lack of institutional and 
democratic maturity of international law. In the absence of other 
institutions and especially of a legislature with which to interact, and, 
more generally, of a political community to represent, the judiciary 
cannot play its interpretive and judicial law-making role. Such a 
judiciary is neither checked by nor accountable to any institution or 
community. Judicial law-making as a reasoning and discursive exercise 
requires law tout court and judges cannot be asked to interpret and 
develop international law without that law being clearly identified for 
them.60 In general international law, not only are legal rules not clearly 
identified for courts, but rather courts are asked to identify these rules 
themselves.  
As a result, not only is international law often left to function 
without proper courts in current circumstances, but the courts 
themselves are requested to function without international law and a 
distinct law-maker that can turn them into judges and let them be. The 
reasons for the former arguably lie in the reasons for the latter. Classic 
international law and law-making have changed, of course, but not 
completely. International courts have also changed, as alluded to before, 
but not completely either. 
 Of course, this disconnect between international law and 
international adjudication is not present everywhere in the international 
legal order, further elevating the uneasiness of judges and legal 
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scholars. For example, certain regional and specialized courts, such as 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU),61 both have compulsory and exclusive 
jurisdiction and have long combined dispute-settlement and law-
enforcement functions. The reason for this lies in the institutional 
framework in which those courts are located or in the institutions to 
which they are accountable:  domestic and European Union (EU) 
institutions for the CJEU and domestic institutions and human rights 
courts for the ECtHR.62 
 Therefore, there is only one way out of the puzzle of international 
adjudication and that is to develop the international, or at least 
transnational, institutional order itself alongside the courts. Specifically, 
one should work on ways to enhance the institutional nature of 
international decision-making to provide judges with an institutional 
correspondent with legitimate authority to which judges may in turn 
respond with the corresponding legitimate authority.63 In the absence of 
a separation of powers within international institutions (whose law is to 
be interpreted by international judges) and of an international legislature 
representing the international community, it is impossible to envisage 
any democratic constraints on judicial discretion or methods of ensuring 
that international judges feel responsible.64 This, however, actually 
implies more than democratic reforms in the judicial process only, and 
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in the election of judges themselves.65 It also requires building a 
political community and a set of democratic institutions outside of and 
including courts, whether at the same level or across levels of 
governance.66  
Of course, such an institutional project raises well-known 
difficulties in global or transnational democratic theory. To cite just one 
of them, the absence of equal and interdependent stakes among 
individuals beyond the regional level (e.g., at the EU level) makes the 
idea of a global or transnational political community implausible for 
now, and arguably even normatively undesirable.67 Alternative 
transnational democratization models across governance levels can be 
developed,68 however, and although adjudication ought to be one of 
their features, it should not be the only one. However, a further 
discussion of this democratic theory debate is beyond the scope of this 
article.69 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
I have two concluding remarks for this reply to Anna Spain’s rich 
and insightful paper about the challenges of international adjudication. 
They stem from observations about the state of international 
adjudication and the existing theory of international adjudication. 
First, the international legal order is clearly impoverished without 
judges. Understanding international adjudication as mere dispute-
resolution may have advantages, but it certainly does not contribute to 
the development of the international rule of law. If the latter is what we 
hope for, we should think carefully about the best ways to achieve it and 
how to make international adjudication part of the process. This leads to 
a second, related conclusion:  focusing on the problems of adjudication 
only and trying to improve its functions and legitimacy from the inside 
will not suffice. We need to think about adjudication from outside the 
judicial box and from a broader institutional context—internationally, as 
I have here, but also transnationally. We cannot improve international 
adjudication without giving attention to the other institutions that make 
for an autonomous and legitimate legal order and that generate the laws 
that have to be judicially enforced and interpreted. In sum, if it is true 
that international “law without courts” is no longer an option, 
developing international courts without law is a pitfall that ought to be 
avoided. 
